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STATEMENT OF 
HOWARD V. KNICELY 
BEFORE THE 
V 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
ON BEHALF OF THE LABOR POLICY ASSOCIATION 
SEPTEMBER 8, 1994 
Labor Policy Association, Inc. . 1015 Fifteenth Street, NW • Washington, DC 20005 • Telephone 202-789-8670 . Fax 202-789-0064 
My name is Howard Knicely. I am Executive Vice President of TRW, and I am 
appearing before the Commission this morning as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of 
the Labor Policy Association. Appearing with me is Rex Adams, Vice President of 
Administration for Mobil and a member of the Association's Executive Committee. As 
Stephen Darien testified at the August 10 hearing, the comments LP A is presenting during 
this final set of hearings are the product of considerable discussion of the Fact Finding 
Report1 by the members of the Association in a series of meetings specifically called for this 
purpose. 
At the outset, we would like to express our appreciation to Secretary of Labor Robert 
Reich and Secretary of Commerce Ronald Brown for assembling this Commission to begin 
not only improving our nation's employment policies, but also the process by which those 
policies are formulated. Work systems, work design and work relationships are in a constant 
state of evolution with each century bringing new attitudes, expectations, and forms of 
association. The present one is no exception. Before the industrial revolution, the concepts 
of union representation and collective bargaining as we know them today were not even 
being discussed in a theoretical sense. As the workplace changed in the late 19th century 
with the introduction of systems of mass production, however, collective bargaining and third 
party representation of rank-and-file employees became the dominant system of labor-
management relations in large enterprises. That system reached a peak during the middle 
part of this century, but since then, the workplace and work practices continued to evolve, 
and with it worker-management relationships. Traditional forms of collective bargaining now 
cover only ten percent of the employed private sector workforce. The system of industrial 
1
 Hereinafter referred to as the Report. 
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relations that guided employment policy in the 1940's, 1950's, and 1960's is now 
exemplified by millionaire baseball owners and millionaire baseball players having shut down 
a sector of the U.S. economy by a strike that may not be resolved for several months to 
come. The baseball strike is instructive because it involves one of the few remaining 
American industries that is still shielded from competition, thus giving the two sets of 
millionaires the luxury of pursuing what many non-participants view as ethereal demands. 
The vast majority of American companies, however, no longer operate in sheltered markets. 
Rather, we are constantly pressured by a host of highly competitive forces which have led 
front-line employees, managers, and unions to seek more cooperative ways of working with 
one another to ensure the long term viability of our organizations. 
It is for these reasons that the members of the Labor Policy Association, the NAM 
and hundreds of other business organizations were pleased that the Commission in its Report 
recognized the existence of these new forms of work relationships, generically described as 
employee participation or employee involvement. While, as expressed in our testimony on 
August 10, LPA members are still not certain whether the Commission understands the full 
significance of employee involvement in today's workplace, you have made an invaluable 
contribution to the continued progress of employment policy by ensuring that any future 
discussion of changes in those policies will deal with this new reality. In our August 10 
statement, we detailed our concerns with the conclusions reached and the suggestions made 
in Chapter II, but on the whole we believe that its findings provide the necessary factual 
basis on which substantive discussions of policy changes can proceed. 
We would additionally point out that Chapter II asks whether these new forms of » 
- 3 -
employee involvement are little more than "temporary fads that will ebb and flow. "2 No 
one has yet discovered the perfect workplace, and we fully expect that the progressive 
organizational designs that have been described to you will eventually be replaced by even 
better ones. In the year 2094 when the Department of Labor (or whatever it is called by 
then) convenes a commission similar to this one, we are certain that its findings of fact will 
include descriptions of late 21st century work systems that are fundamentally different than 
the ones that were commonly prevailing in the mid-20th century. 
We were also pleased with Chapter IV of the Report because it acknowledges perhaps 
the most important employment policy development since the 1960's—the shift in employee 
power in worker-management relations from unions to plaintiff attorneys. The chapter 
breaks new ground in dealing with the legal gridlock that this shift has generated by again 
providing the necessary factual basis for substantive discussions. Regarding Chapter I of the 
Report, LPA has not offered a detailed economic analysis of its portrait of gloom nor do we 
intend to do so. Granted, the U.S. has sigmficant economic and social problems that cry out 
for improvement. We would only say that, accepting your picture as correct, it is surprising 
that: 
1. our borders are being overrun by so many people desperately 
seeking entry into the good life of the United States, 
2. our rate of joblessness is so much lower than in Canada, Europe 
and other countries that have what the Commission may believe 
to be far more progressive employment policies, and 
2
 Report, 48. 
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3. American business is competing so well with countries whose 
workers don't earn in a day what U.S. employees earn in an 
hour. 
That brings us to Chapter HI of the Report, the subject of today's hearing. In our 
opinion, it can be described most charitably as a disappointment. Not only does it present a 
decidedly one-sided view of the issues of union representation and collective bargaining, it 
perpetuates a number of myths about labor-management relations. As long as policy makers 
continue believing in these myths, which are only reinforced by Chapter Hi's findings, any 
serious attempt at improving worker-management relations in this particular arena will be 
frustrated. Unlike Chapters II and IV of the Report, we do not feel a good faith attempt has 
been made in Chapter DI to establish a set of facts that could bring the parties together to 
begin serious policy discussions, nor do we accept several of your findings as facts. 
The findings the Commission has either explicitly made or strongly implied in 
Chapter HI can be summarized as follows: 
1. American workers have a strong preference for traditional union 
representation and collective bargaining that is being frustrated 
by employer hostility to unions. 
2. This hostility is the primary, if not the sole, reason for the 
decline in union representation in America. 
3. The principal manifestation of this hostility is employees seeking 
union representation who are intimidated into voting against the 
union by employers who routinely fire anyone sympathetic to 
such representation. 
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4. If a majority of employees in a bargaining unit has the courage 
to overcome this hostility and vote in favor of union 
representation, one-third of the workplaces desiring such 
representation will never be able to negotiate their first contract 
because employers will do everything in their power both inside 
and outside the law to frustrate agreement. 
5. There is a "dismal side" to labor relations in that some 
employers break the law to resist unionization. 
We would like to deal with each one of these "findings" in turn. 
Employee Preferences 
Regarding the question of employee preference for union representation, the Report 
attaches great significance to surveys which show that 30% of the non-union workforce 
wishes to be represented by a union. We attach greater significance to the fact that 70% do 
not wish to be represented. A number of recent surveys reinforce this finding. Three 
surveys conducted in the mid-1980s, including one specifically for the AFL-CIO, found that 
65-75 % of all non-union workers would reject union representation in a secret ballot 
election.3 These percentages are matched by the percentage (64.9%) of votes cast against 
union representation in all NLRB elections.4 Attitudes have not changed since, as was 
3
 75%—"The Lifeline for Unions: Recruiting," Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1987, HI; 65%—Louis Harris 
and Associates, Inc., A Study on the Outlook for Trade Union Organizing 63 (Nov. 1984) (survey conducted for 
the AFL-CIO); 67%—Institute for Social Research, Quality of Employment Survey (University of Michigan, 
1977), cited in James L. Medoff, The Public's Image of Labor and Labor's Response (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Harvard University, 1984), 10. 
* Leo Troy, "Will An Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?," 13 Harvard Journal of Law &. 
Public Policy 583, 599 (1990). 
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shown in a 1991 Penn+Schoen poll conducted for the Employment Policy Foundation which 
found that 73% of all employees do not favor having a union in the workplace. 
We would bring to the attention of the Commission a survey conducted by the AFL-
CIO's Department of Organization and Field Services that was released in February of 1989, 
a copy of which is attached to our statement. In a cover letter to AFL-CIO affiliates, Ms. 
Vicki Saporta, then Director of Organizing for the Teamsters, said the survey summarized 
interviews with union organizers involved in 189 NLRB elections in units over 50 held 
between 1986 and 1987. The survey itself states: 
In order to obtain this data, lengthy interviews were Conducted 
with the lead organizers in these campaigns, during which 
questions were asked concerning the union's tactics, the 
company's tactics, and characteristics of the workforce.5 
This survey, we would submit, may help the Commission determine the accuracy of the facts 
contained in its Report that it now desires to become the basis for discussions of policy 
changes. 
Interestingly, the survey found that the northeast, particularly New England, is the 
most inhospitable for union organizing with the win rate there only 32%. We would point 
out that states like Connecticut, Massachusetts and Rhode Island constitute an area with a 
large percentage of workforces represented by unions. At the same time, the survey found 
that the greatest percentage of organizing success was in the west/southwest, a region in 
which union representation is much less picvalent. There the organizers enjoyed a 51% rate 
of victory. One would assume that if unionized working relationships were as successful as 
5
 Department of Organization and Field Services, AFL-CIO Organizing Survey: 1986-1987 NLRB 
Elections, (AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., February, 1989), 46 [hereinafter, AFL-CIO Survey]. 
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Chapter HI makes them out to be, then the areas of the country with the heaviest unionization 
rates would be those with the highest union win rates, yet that is not the case. An inference 
that may reasonably be drawn from these statistics is that the more employees know about 
the actual operation of unions in the workplace, the less likely they may be to vote in favor 
of union representation. This same inference can also be drawn from another statistic in the 
AFL-CIO survey in the section entitled, "Prior Union Exposure" which came to the 
following conclusions: 
Familiarity and prior experience with unions has an ambiguous 
effect on the ability of unions to win NLRB elections. If former 
union members make up a small portion of the workforce, the 
win rate rises slightly. However, if former members made up 
more than half the workforce, the win rate is only 29%.6 
As the Commission undertakes an examination of government policies to determine how they 
might be altered to increase unionization of the workforce, we would suggest that this 
particular statistic be given very careful consideration. 
We would also direct the Commission's attention to Part A of Chapter III which gives 
the Commission's perspective on "Experience Under the National Labor Relations Act." In 
Section 1, the NLRB certification election process is described in great detail. Part A, 
however, contains no description of the NLRB decertification election process—the process 
by which employees represented by a particular union disaffiliate themselves from that 
union—nor is there mention of that process anywhere else in the Report, even though about 
15% of all elections conducted by the NLRB are decertification elections. In addition to the 
6
 AFL-CIO Survey, 52. 
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100,000 or so employees who annually vote against becoming unionized in a certification 
election, almost 15,000 vote to get rid of a union that is already in place. Moreover, while 
employees choose not to be represented in about one out of every two elections, in 
decertification elections, they choose to no longer be represented in seven out of ten. 
The lack of discussion of the decertification process raises another significant issue. 
We are surprised that despite the Commission's own data that 70% of the workforce has a 
preference against union representation, not one of the 354 witnesses brought before you was 
a rank-and-file employee who testified why they had voted against the union either in a 
certification or a decertification election. We find it inexplicable that a federal commission 
with the mandate this one has would choose to ignore completely the views of the majority of 
the American workforce. In contrast, the Commission did hear from a number of employees 
who were brought forth by organized labor to portray the so-called "Human Face of the 
Confrontational Representation Process." In doing so, the Commission apparently accepted 
at face value everything it was told by these witnesses without seeking testimony from 
employees in the same workplace that might have had a different point a view. 
A close look at the story of one of these witnesses—Judy Ray of Peabody, 
Massachusetts—is telling. Ms. Ray testified that she had been fired by Jordan Marsh Stores 
on the day after Thanksgiving solely because she was a union organizer. She labelled the 
"harassment" she had suffered from the company a "disgrace." The Report reprints Ms. 
Ray's account as one of the "facts" the Commission had found. The day before the June 10 
election, however, the local paper published a letter from 29 Jordan Marsh employees 
characterizing Ray's actions against the company as a "personal vendetta" and specifically 
refuting Judy Ray's statement that "she speaks for us:" 
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Her attempt to divide a staff that works well as a team, despite 
her recent public statements and condemnations, are offensive 
and ineffective.7 
Apparently, a solid majority of the employees agreed more with the sentiments 
expressed in the letter than with Ms. Ray. The union was rejected by a 4 to 1 margin (155 
to 39) on June 10. Employees who voted against the union claimed to be "absolutely thrilled 
. . . . We did not want the union in our store, and everyone stuck together on that." 8 
Later this month, an NLRB administrative law judge will conduct a hearing to 
determine whether Ms. Ray, a commission-paid sales person, was fired for union activity or, 
as the store claims, because she stole a sale of a television set from a fellow employee. We 
would point out that an attempt by the NLRB on July 29, 1994, to obtain an injunction 
ordering her reinstatement was thrown out by a federal district court.9 
If the Commission is truly interested in establishing a set of facts on which 
substantive policy discussions can proceed regarding the direction of unions and the 
workplace, it will need to do far more digging into organizing campaigns such as the one at 
Jordan Marsh in order that all the facts, and not just a select few, are on the table. Business 
groups would have been pleased to provide "real people—American employees",10 as the 
Commission describes them, who would have represented the 70% of the workforce that 
public opinion polls show prefer to represent themselves in the workplace. Had we done so, 
7
 Letter to the Editor, The Peabody Times, June 9, 1994. 
8
 Andrew D. Russell, "Jordan Marsh Employees Reject Union," The Salem Evening News, June 13, 1994, 
(quoting employee Mary O'Leary). 
9
 Rosemary Pye and the National Labor Relations Board v. Jordan Marsh Stores Corporation, No. 94-
11509EFH (D. Mass. July 29, 1994). 
10
 Report, 76. 
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however, our strong suspicion is that the business community's production of such witnesses 
would have been viewed as self-serving by the Commission. Indeed, the surprisingly hostile 
reception the Commission accorded Chester McCammon, a non-union welder from Universal 
Dynamics who addressed the Commission on August 10 as part of the management panel, is 
illustrative. 
Discharge of Union Activists 
With regard to the Commission's conclusions on illegal discharges, the Report as well 
as studies published by certain Commissioners have painstakingly attempted to demonstrate 
that illegal discharges occurring in an organizing campaign have increased considerably in 
recent years and that those discharges are a primary cause of union decline in America. We 
do not intend to continue splitting hairs over the proper measurement of this activity using 
the available data. Rather, we challenge the underlying premise of the Commission's use of 
the data; i.e., that the alleged increase has been a major cause of organized labor's decline. 
The notion that employers can stifle organizing drives by firing union supporters has been 
pounded into the American consciousness so thoroughly and for so long that no one, 
including this Commission, has apparently thought it necessary to challenge it. 
Testimony was presented to the Commission by former Solicitor of Labor William 
Kilberg that management attorneys invariably advise their clients not to terminate any 
employees during an organizing drive who have any identification with the union because, 
more often than not, such discharges can have a galvanizing effect on the employees. We 
couldn't help but notice the skepticism with which this testimony was received by the 
Commission during the February 24, 1994 hearing, and because of that we were not 
surprised that there was no acknowledgement of it in the Report. However, Mr. Kilberg's 
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testimony was recently echoed in a July 28, 1994, letter to the editor of the Philadelphia 
Inquirer by John Morris, President of the Pennsylvania Conference of Teamsters: 
Employers actually make a mistake when they fire 
employees during a Teamsters organizing drive. In 
effect, they create martyrs that strengthen the solidarity 
of the employees when they see the support the 
Teamsters give to the discharged workers.11 
The AFL-CIO survey described above bears this out. In the section headed, "Discharges," 
the union organizers polled came to the following conclusion— 
Interestingly, unions seem to have a higher success rate (46%) 
where there is a firing than where there is not a firing (41 %).12 
This statistic may explain why, notwithstanding any alleged increase in discharges, unions 
file objections in only 6% of all elections, with 2% of all election results being overturned, 
percentages that have remained relatively constant over the years. This point was made to 
the Commission by another witness, former NLRB Chairman Edward Miller, but the 
Commission chose to relegate this important piece of information to a footnote.13 
These facts clearly demonstrate that unions are losing elections because of employee 
choice, not employer illegalities. Therefore, despite the hyperbole to the contrary that we 
have heard repeatedly throughout these proceedings, it should come as no surprise that very 
few employees list fear of employer reprisals as a factor in their decision to remain non-
union. According to a 1991 Penn+Schoen poll conducted for the Employment Policy 
11
 John P. Morris, Letter to the Editor, The Philadelphia Inquirer, July 28, 1994. 
12
 ALF-CIO Survey, 53. 
13
 Report, 70, footnote 5. 
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Foundation that was submitted to the Commission, only 1 % of all non-union employees who 
opposed having a union did so out of fear of employer reprisal. 
Employer Hostility as Sole Cause of Union Decline 
Turning to the implied finding that employer hostility is the sole cause of union 
decline in America, while the Commission does not speak directly to the causes of this 
decline, it does detail the statistics regarding that decline and then devotes the bulk of 
Chapter HI to a lengthy discussion of employer violations of the National Labor Relations 
Act, creating the strong implication that those violations are the sole cause of diminished 
representation. We believe that it would have been more conducive to serious discussion of 
possible changes in the NLRA if the Commission had tried to look behind these statistics to 
develop a more complete picture of the causes of union decline. For example, changes in 
human resource practices, union organizing deficiencies, expansion of statutory employment 
protections, market forces, employee attitudes and labor's confrontational style are all factors 
deserving exploration, as discussed briefly below. 
Changes in Human Resources Practices. As several employer witnesses like myself 
have testified to the Commission, if thirty years ago my peers and I had espoused to our 
managements the kinds of workplace practices that we routinely do today, we would have 
been summarily dismissed. Hierarchial work systems are being abandoned as employers 
recognize that employees are an intellectual resource that must be tapped if the organization 
is going to survive in the new economic environment. We believe that the best way to 
attract a competitive workforce is to offer an attractive workplace, not just in terms of wages 
and benefits, but also in the extent to which employees become integrally involved in the 
operation of the worksite, problem solving and dispute resolution. If, in the process, 
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employees are gaining a "voice" in that workplace, it should not make any difference to the 
Commission that it may lead to a decline in the union win rate. 
Expansion of Statutory Employment Protections. As Chapter IV of the Report 
describes so eloquently, the declining trend in union density has been matched by an 
ascending trend in new workplace laws at the federal, state and local level, not to mention 
the liberal trend in common law developments. Indeed, during the past year Congress has 
been debating whether to legislate one of the most basic components of any collective 
bargaining agreement—a health care plan. As more and more components of collective 
bargaining are superseded by employment legislation, the less meaningful a collective 
bargaining agreement becomes, and the less attractive a union is to employees. 
Union Organizing Deficiencies. On this point, the unions, when talking amongst 
themselves, have been their own harshest critics. A 1991 survey conducted in cooperation 
with the AFL-CIO Organizing Department concluded: "[TJhe results from this study clearly 
show that union tactics, taken as a group, play a greater role in explaining the election 
outcome than any other group of variables in the model, including employer tactics, 
organizer background, and unit demographics."14 
Market Forces. Finally, there are a panoply of market forces—both domestic and 
international—that have had a dramatic impact on American unionism. For example, much 
of the decline can simply be attributed to extensive downsizing by unionized companies, 
particularly during the 1980s. The growth in international competition—boosted by 
appreciation of the dollar during the 1980s—has been a major contributor. Imports into the 
United States grew to 13% of the GNP in 1990, almost three times the percentage in 1960. 
14
 Bronfenbrenner, Successful Union Strategies for Winning Certification Elections and First Contracts: 
Report to Union Participants, Part I: Organizing Survey Results, (1991). 
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This outside competition has made it more and more difficult for organized labor to capture 
an entire industry and remove labor cost competition through pattern bargaining. The 
inability of a number of companies in traditionally unionized industries to match the 
competition resulted in a decline in union membership in the manufacturing sector by about 
2.3 million during the 1980s.15 
The impact of deregulation on four of our major industries—communications, airlines, 
public utilities and trucking—has had a similar impact. Previously, these sectors were well-
insulated against cost competition by a regulatory structure that set prices and limited 
participation by newcomers. With the entry of new cost-competitive players into these 
industries, high labor costs can no longer be easily passed on to the customer, and new non-
v 
union competitors have captured a good share of these markets. The result was a decline of 
about 625,000 in union membership in the 1980s in these sectors alone.16 
Further, the significant areas of job growth in the United States, going back to the 
1950s, have occurred in the service sector, which has traditionally been less organized than 
the manufacturing sector. Beginning in the 1950s—at the same time union membership was 
peaking—the United States shifted from a predominantly manufacturing to a predominantly 
service economy. This shift has occurred with growth in advertising, computer software, 
data processing, temporary personnel, management, business consulting, legal, accounting, 
engineering and architectural services. Even within manufacturing, there has been a 
substantial growth in "in-house" services, which has contributed to the decline in 
15
 Leo Troy, "Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?," 13 Harvard Journal of Law & 
Public Policy (1990), 583, 615. 
16
 Ibid., 616. 
- 15-
manufacturing union density from 32% at the beginning of the 1980s to 22% at the end.17 
Of course, none of these new market realities touched the American public sector to 
any significant degree, where union representation has increased in recent years. That 
sector's insulation from cost competition is a much more relevant explanation for union 
growth than the absence of employer opposition cited in the Report.18 
We would also point out that the decline in unionization is far from a uniquely 
American phenomenon. Had this panel been able to hear from Professor Leo Troy of 
Rutgers University, he could have explained how the deunionization of America is being 
mirrored in Canada and the countries of Western Europe as they also shift to a service-based 
economy, even though the labor laws of those countries are far more favorable to union 
organization. The shift in Canada, for example, produced a 20% decline in private sector 
union density from 1975 to 1985.19 
First Contracts 
On the subject of the Commission's findings regarding first contracts, the Report 
points to data addressing the difficulty the parties have reaching agreement in first contract 
situations. The Commission implies that this is a result of employers flouting their duty to 
bargain under the law by either engaging in surface bargaining or refusing to bargain 
altogether. The Commission then suggests that stronger remedies would correct this. 
17
 Ibid., 615. 
18
 Report, 78. 
19
 Leo Troy, "Is the U.S. Unique in the Decline of Private Sector Unionism?," 11 Journal of Labor 
Research, (Spring 1990), 111, 127. 
- 16-
Although the Commission has reached an unequivocal conclusion regarding this trend, 
the fact of the matter is that there is no universal time-series data available to test whether 
first contract failures are any more widespread today than they ever were. As is noted by 
the Commission, it has only been since 1986 that the FMCS has received notice and copies 
of new certifications. Studies conducted before 1986 were limited to sample populations 
with no tracking of those populations over any significant period of time. The 1966 study by 
Ross cited in the Report was based on a sample drawn from only six of thirty NLRB regional 
offices. 
Because no one knows with any degree of certainty whether first contract failures 
have increased, let us assume for purposes of discussion that they have. As Prof. William 
Gould IV, a former member of this Commission and current Chairman of the NLRB, has 
written in Agenda for Reform: The Future of Employment Relationships and the Law: 
the fact is that employers have been able to convince workers 
not to join unions by providing them with benefits comparable 
in most respects (and sometimes superior to them) to those 
contained in collective bargaining agreements negotiated by 
unions. Thus . . . a kind of benevolent paternalism has helped 
to succeed in making workers disinterested in unions.20 
We would hardly describe competitive pay and benefits in modern companies as "benevolent 
paternalism," but Chairman Gould is correct in saying that companies spend a considerable 
amuuiii of time ensuring both internal and external equity in their compensation programs. 
They do so, however, for reasons that have nothing to do with warding off organizing drives 
20
 William Gould, Agenda for Reform (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 42. 
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and much to do with ensuring fairness and minimizing turnover. One byproduct of this 
attention to equity is that in order to win an election a union may find it necessary to promise 
the employees an economic package that the employer is not capable of delivering. We 
would remind the Commission that there has never been a "duty to agree" under the National 
Labor Relations Act, only a duty to bargain in good faith. Thus, neither the employer—who 
can only go so far in stretching labor costs to remain competitive—nor the union—which has 
to bring back an attractive wage/benefit package to justify its election victory—is breaking 
the law by engaging in hard bargaining. 
We would also point out that it has been the experience of many LPA members that 
once union organizers successfully complete a campaign, they often move on to the next site. 
No experienced negotiator may be left behind to coach the employees on a day-to-day basis 
through their first negotiation. As a result, a first contract situation often involves a group of 
employees with very high expectations, but with little experience working with one another 
to achieve a contract. Under these circumstances, the fact that two out of every three first 
contract negotiations may result in an agreement (assuming that figure is correct) should be 
viewed in a positive light. Further, should the employer break the law and fail to bargain in 
good faith, the union has more at its disposal than simply going to the Board to get a 
bargaining order. It can call a strike. This particular strike will have even greater potency 
because, being an unfair labor practice strike, the employer is barred from hiring permanent 
replacements. 
The "Dismal Side" 
In Exhibit III-8, the Commission devotes four full pages to depicting "The Human 
Face of the Confrontational Representation Process," describing it as the "dismal side" of 
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labor relations. We would suggest that it should come as no surprise to the Commission that 
most things in the human experience have a dismal side and that the field of labor relations is 
no exception. We do not deny that there are some employers who, no matter how tough the 
labor laws are written, will make every attempt to undermine them using illegal behavior. 
The same is true, however, on the union side. For that reason, we do not see how the 
Commission expects there to be a serious debate regarding how worker-management relations 
are to be improved by turning a blind eye to union misconduct. 
It was union corruption and violence that led to enactment of the Labor Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, yet a cursory review of recent NLRB decisions 
indicates such conduct is still very much a part of worker-management relations. For 
example: 
• In Swing Staging, Inc. (29-CA-15756, August 5, 1994), an 
election was set aside by an NLRB administrative law judge 
because of union misconduct. During the course of a 1990 
organizing drive by Teamsters Local 282 of Brooklyn, the Judge 
found that a hangman's noose was placed on the president's car 
and a nail driven through the radiator; the brakes of a company 
truck were damaged; the line to the company's oil tank was cut; 
an employee was told he would lose his pension from another 
union if he voted against the Teamsters; employees were told 
that the "union boys" would beat up whoever didn't vote for the 
union and break the windows of an employee's car if he made 
waves with the union; and, employees were told that the union 
was connected to John Gotti who would "take care of" the 
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president if he gave the union a hard time. The reference to Mr. 
Gotti apparently was not a hollow threat. The AU pointed out 
that Mr. Gotti had been named as an unindicted co-conspirator 
with various officials of Local 282 for allegedly participating in 
a scheme to extort payoffs and kickbacks from various 
construction industry employers.21 
In Cedar Grove Manor Convalescent Center, 314 NLRB No. 
106 (July 29, 1994), the employer refused to negotiate with 
District 1115 (H.E.R.E.), which had ousted the incumbent union 
in an election. The employer raised as an affirmative defense 
the union's conduct, claiming that it rendered the election 
meaningless. The record indicated that District 1115 originally 
offered $1,500,000 in cash under the table to the incumbent 
union to buy the unit. Later, the director of District 1115 
threatened the incumbent union's business agent with bodily 
harm in order to dissuade the business agent from continuing to 
give testimony before the Board. The director and the business 
agent had the following conversation over the phone: "Why 
don't you stop this nonsense with the Labor Board or else." "Or 
else what?" "You will get your legs broken . . . Listen, people 
21
 The procedural history of this case demonstrates the NLRB's lack of concern with union violence. The 
union won the elections at the two worksites by votes of 11-5 and 6-3. Despite all this evidence of misconduct, 
the Regional Director, after an investigation, recommended that the employer's objections be overruled and the 
union certified. The Board agreed, but the employer refused to bargain. The Board ordered the employer to 
bargain with the union, but the D.C. Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and remanded the case in 
order for a hearing to be held. Finally, almost four years after the election, the ALJ is now ordering that the 
election be set aside. The company, meanwhile, has gone out of business. 
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like you wind up in wooden boxes." Although the case revealed 
that this was not the first time Local 1115 agents had engaged in 
such conduct, a three-member panel of the Board (Gould, 
Devaney and Stephens) voted unanimously to require the 
employer to bargain with District 1115. 
Often, union violence is not easily detected. In A Troublemaker's Handbook: How to 
Fight Back Where You Work-arid Win!22, a publication by the Labor Education and 
Research Project, the authors describe a so-called "in-plant strategy" that uses illegal on-the-
job practices to apply pressure to an unnamed employer without having to engage in a strike. 
We would call the Commission's attention to one passage that describes the kinds of 
activities engaged in: 
One of the key departments [the "solidarity committee"] identified was the 
foundry, the heart of the entire production operation. At the center of the 
foundry was a large forging machine that turned bar stock into coil springs. If 
a piece of bar stock got caught sideways in the machine, it would melt and 
immobilize the machine. For one reason or another, that began to happen 
more and more frequently.23 
Often, violence occurs when a particular company is on labor's "hit list" as is the 
case with BE&K, a non-union construction company. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled in BE&K Construction v. NLKB against a Michigan Ironworkers local in which was 
implicated in a 1989 riot protesting the use of BE&K for a paper mill expansion in 
22
 Daniel LaBotz, A Troublemakers Handbook: How to Fight Back Where You Work and Win! (Detroit: 
Labor Notes Handbook, 1991). 
23
 Ibid., 119. 
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International Falls, Minnesota.24 The riot involved 450 people who burned the BE&K 
workers' campsite and injured a number of people while causing $2 million in damages. 
Fear of a similar outbreak was the cause of BE&K losing a contract to perform construction 
on a pulp and paper plant near McGehee, Arkansas, following an illegal boycott by the 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and the United Paperworkers. This boycott wound up 
costing the unions $20 million as a result of a federal jury award. 
In the last few years alone, the national electronic and print media have reported in 
detail the violent strikes that occurred in the Greyhound, New York Daily News, Pittsburgh 
Press and similar bitter controversies. The United Mine Workers was fined $52 million by a 
Virginia state court for the violence that swept through the coal fields during the Pittston 
strike. The "human face" of labor relations in certain worksites is exemplified by Eddie 
York who was shot to death in November, 1993, for crossing a picket line. Mr. York was a 
backhoe operator, an independent contractor who was cleaning a reclamation pond in Logan 
County, West Virginia. This was work that was not performed by the union, but after he 
had been escorted off the property by two security vehicles and was driving along a public 
road, strikers began hurling rocks and then shots were fired from a wooded area. Mr. 
York's truck was hit at least three times, the third shot being fatal.25 
In the 163 pages of the Commission's Report, there is no mention of union violence 
nor its impact on collective bargaining and worker-management relations. Accordingly, we 
are submitting to the Commission a copy of a comprehensive study of workplace violence, 
24
 BE&K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 23 F.3d 1459, (8th Cir. 1994). 
25
 Congressional Record 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993. Vol. 139, H 10066-67 (statement by Rep. 
Stenholm). 
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entitled Union Violence: The Record and The Response by Courts, Legislatures and the 
NLRB?6, by Professors Armand J. Thieblot and Thomas R. Haggard, published by the 
University of Pennsylvania in 1984. 
By refusing to acknowledge the on-going presence of violence in collective bargaining 
and labor relations in a review of the current state of workplace relations, it can be said that 
the Commission is impliedly condoning its continued use to achieve collective bargaining 
objectives. In our opinion, it is incumbent upon the Commission to use its "bully pulpit" to 
repudiate the belief that a certain amount of violence is acceptable in labor disputes. 
Acceptance of violence is seldom found in public discussions of any other ideological 
conflicts. For example, while there are far more beatings and murders on picket lines in 
labor disputes than those surrounding abortion clinics, Congress recently enacted the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (Public Law 103-259) that makes violence, 
intimidation or obstruction which interferes with persons entering abortion clinics a federal 
crime. During consideration of that law, attempts were made in both the House and Senate 
to broaden the proscription to cover labor violence. Rep. Stenholm (D-TX), for example, 
argued: 
[I]f it is not appropriate for an abortion protester to intimidate a 
woman seeking her legal choice to reproductive health services, 
then I believe it should also be inappropriate for a striking 
worker to intimidate another worker attempting to cross the 
picket line to exercise his or her right to work.27 
26
 Armand J. Thieblot, Jr. and Thomas R. Haggard, Union Violence: The Record and the Response by 
Courts, Legislatures, and the NLRB (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, University of Pennsylvania, 1984). 
27
 Congressional Record, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993. Vol. 139, H10065 (statement by Rep. Stenholm). 
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The leadership in the House and Senate, however, prevented a vote on these amendments. 
In addition to proposing enactment of a measure similar to Public Law 103-259 
applicable to labor dispute violence, the Commission should consider other worker 
protections as well. Currently, violence per se is not an unfair labor practice under the 
National Labor Relations Act. We urge the Commission to propose making the use or threat 
of violence by either a union or an employer to accomplish collective bargaining goals an 
unfair labor practice with injunctive relief similar to that available against secondary boycott 
activities. In addition, individuals engaged in violence aimed at furthering either the 
employer's or the union's goals could be rebuttably presumed to be acting as their agents, 
thus eliminating the problems inherent in establishing the necessary "chain of command" to 
obtain relief. At a minimum, individual employees who are victims of union violence should 
be able to obtain "make whole" relief from the union in the form of back pay for any wage 
losses caused by the violence. Surprisingly, the Board has refused to provide even this 
remedy.28 
Corporate Campaigns 
In addition to ignoring the dismal side of labor relations caused by union violence, the 
Commission's Report made no mention of the growth of the "corporate campaign" and the 
negative impact it has had on collective bargaining. Because certain aspects of corporate 
campaigns raise serious public policy questions, no thorough study of collective bargaining in 
America today would fail to examine this new phenomenon in labor relations. Given the 
Commission's deep concern about the tensions involved in and the level of resources devoted 
28
 Teamsters Local 901 (Lock Joint Pipe & Co.), 202 NLRB 399 (1973). 
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to organizing campaigns, it is surprising that the Commission chose not to focus on this area. 
A definition of the corporate campaign can be found in the AFL-CIO guidebook 
entitled Developing New Tactics: Winning With Coordinated Campaigns which describes how 
a coordinated campaign applies pressure to a target company: 
It means seeking vulnerabilities in all of the company's political 
and economic relationships—with other unions, shareholders, 
customers, creditors and government agencies—to achieve union 
goals.29 
Unlike traditional labor-management disputes, corporate campaigns go outside the company 
to generate public hostility and antagonisms towards the target corporation. In addition, they 
seek to manipulate federal regulatory agencies such that the target becomes enmeshed in 
enforcement actions. According to the AFL-CIO guidebook: 
Businesses are regulated by a virtual alphabet soup of federal, 
state and local agencies, which monitor nearly every aspect of 
corporate behavior. . . . Regulatory agencies exist to protect 
citizens, and unions can use the regulators to their advantage. 
An intransigent employer may find that in addition to labor 
troubles, there are suddenly government problems as well.30 
A Service Employees International Union Manual provides similar guidance: 
Moreover, even if the violations are completely unrelated to bargaining 
issues, your [union's] investigations may give management added 
29
 Charles R. Perry, Union Corporate Campaigns (Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, University of 
Pennsylvania, 1987), 1. 
30
 Ibid., 6. 
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incentive to improve its relationship with you. Management officials 
may find that...the employer now is facing... 
• Extra expense to meet regulatory requirement or qualify for 
necessary permits and licenses. 
• Cost delays in operations while those 
requirements are met. 
• Fines or other penalties for violating legal 
obligations. 
• Damage to the employer's public image, which 
could jeopardize political or community support, 
which in turn could mean less business or public 
funding.31 
It is not an uncommon experience for unionized companies about to enter collective 
bargaining negotiations to have a slew of charges filed against them at OSHA, wage-hour, 
EEOC and other federal agencies. There are more dramatic examples, however. In a July 
26, 1994, decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, USS-Posco Industries v. Contra 
Costa County Building and Construction Trades Council, No. 92-15497, the court found very 
troublesome the activities undertaken by a group of California construction unions to wipe 
out non-union construction in northern California. Again, the unions' target was the 
aforementioned BE&K, which had entered into a contract involving 800 jobs to update a steel 
facility. The company was subjected to numerous lawsuits, protests against permits, 
lobbying at the local level for new environmental ordinances requiring more permits, and 
Service Employees International Union, Contract Campaign Manual, (1988), 3-21, footnote 38. 
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encouragement of subcontractors to protest nonexistent safety violations. Despite its 
concerns over the legitimacy of the union's activities, the court found that the union was 
protected against an antitrust action by an exemption for those petitioning the government for 
redress of grievances. While the exemption does not apply to so-called "sham petitioning," 
the court noted that fifteen of the twenty-nine filings of complaints with the government had 
proven successful. The fact that those complaints never would have been filed but for the 
unions' desire to harass the company was irrelevant. 
We are also submitting to the Commission a copy of a book published in 1987 by the 
University of Pennsylvania entitled Union Corporate Campaigns by Prof. Charles R. Perry 
that provides several case studies of corporate campaigns and their impact on labor-
management relations. 
To summarize our concerns with the findings in Chapter ID, the Commission states 
on page 78 of the Report that: 
The Commission has not sought to determine the role of 
particular campaign tactics, legal or illegal, on the outcome of 
NLRB elections nor the reasons for the decline in the proportion 
of workers covered by collective bargaining in the United 
States. 
That statement notwithstanding, the Commission did in fact reach certain conclusions, either 
explicitly or impliedly, about the role of particular tactics and the reasons for the decline. 
The problem that we have with the Report is that only one side of the story is presented, the 
story written by organized labor. Unlike Chapters II and IV, Chapter III makes no serious 
attempt at giving the American public a complete picture of the facts involved in 
contemporary worker representation and collective bargaining. 
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Another View of the Findings 
While Chapter HI provides mostly a one-dimensional view of collective bargaining in 
the United States, a reader willing to pick carefully through its paragraphs and footnotes will 
eventually be able to cobble together a much different set of facts than the ones adopted by 
the Commission, ones that lead to very different conclusions regarding where reforms in the 
National Labor Relations Act are needed. These alternative findings are as follows: 
1. Collective bargaining, where it exists, is working very well. The Report states: 
"In most workplaces with collective bargaining, the system of labor-management negotiations 
works well."32 We agree with this statement, but it is troubling that it was buried in the 
text of the Report and not adopted as one of the principal findings. We recognize that 
commissions tend to (and should) focus on problems that need to be corrected, but in view of 
the apocalyptic statements elsewhere in the Report about the state of collective bargaining in 
America today, we believe this conclusion should have been elevated to the status of a major 
finding. 
2. The National Labor Relations Act is being administered in a timely, effective 
manner bv the National Labor Relations Board. Despite the inclusion in the Report of 
considerable statistical data to prove this point, the Report bends over backwards to avoid 
drawing this conclusion, including relegating to a footnote its own assessment that the 
Report, 64. 
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Board's regional offices settle charges and issue complaints within 45 days, "a track record 
that just about any other labor or employment agency would be proud to have. "33 (See 
Chart I). Because approximately 80-85% of all meritorious cases are settled, this "track 
record" merits more than a footnote. (See Chart II). 
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Report, 71, footnote 7. 
- 2 9 -
Tke Report's data regarding the Board's conduct of representation elections are no 
less impressive. A constant refrain by organized labor for the past two decades has been that 
employers have successfully manipulated NLRB procedures to ensure that the representation 
election occurs long after the certification petition is filed—sometimes years later. The 
Report attempts to bolster this complaint by asserting that 20% of elections take more than 
60 days.34 Of course, this also means that 80% take less than 60 days, compared to 68.9% 
in 1975. (See Chart HI). Moreover, Exhibit HI-2 at page 82 of the Report shows that, in 
1993, 94.7% were conducted within 90 days as contrasted with 89% in 1975, and that only 
1.2% went beyond six months while 2.9% did so in 1975. In other words, the processing of 
elections by the Board has improved during the past 20 years. 
Percent of Elections Within 60 Days of Filing 
of Petition (1975-1993) 
100% 
1993 
Chart HI 
jvlore significantly, as the Commission observes (once again in a footnote), the data 
demonstrate that the NLRB is able to conduct those elections in a fair manner with 97-98% 
of all elections being free of any sustainable objections from either party. (See Chart IV). 
34
 Report, 68. 
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In addition, the credibility of the Board with the Federal courts has soared in recent years, 
with its success rate climbing from 70-80% in the 1960s to 80-90% in the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s. The only notable exception was during the Carter Administration when, in 1979 and 
1980, the rate slipped to 77% and 76% respectively. (See Chart V). We note that in 1968, 
the AFL-CIO testified to Congress that appellate court affirmance of NLRB decisions is the 
NLRB Success Rate in Federal Courts 
(1960-1993) 
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Chart V 
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"only measurable and objective test" of the Board's interpretation of the statute.35 Using 
that yardstick, the Board's interpretations have steadily improved since the Carter 
Administration. 
We would, however, point out one area regarding the administration of the NLRB 
that does deserve the Commission's attention. While there has been considerable discussion 
of NLRB delays during the past two decades, the fact is that these delays involve about 2% 
of the cases. The case backlog has improved in recent years—declining from 1,000 in 1983 
to just over 300. However, the median time for a Board decision—17 months—would 
indicate a problem lies at the Board member level. One of the reasons for this delay is the 
constant turnover in Board members and difficulties the White House has in clearing new 
Board member appointments through the Senate confirmation process. In fact, since 1978 
the NLRB has been at its full, five-member strength only 58% of the time. One of the 
principal reasons for this occurrence has been organized labor's opposition to certain 
candidates proposed by Presidents Reagan and Bush, and the business community's 
opposition to particular persons nominated by Presidents Carter and Clinton. When labor or 
management become concerned with the balance on the Board, their only remedy is to block 
the confirmation until such time as an accommodation can be worked out between the 
parties. The Commission could perform a valuable service in suggesting a better method for 
the selection and confirmation of Board members than the system currently in place. 
Rep. Major Owens (D-NY) has offered a proposal worth considering— 
H.R. 1466—which would alternate Board memberships by allowing organized labor and 
35
 Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Committee on Judiciary, Congressional Oversight 
of Administrative Agencies (National Labor Relations Board), 90th Cong., 2d sess. 1968, 321 (statement of 
Thomas E, Harris, Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO). 
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business to each select a Board member in succession. While the Owens bill may not be the 
perfect solution, it suggests a direction that would expedite the process considerably while 
ensuring balance at the Board. We strongly recommend that you take a close look at the 
Owens bill or any similar proposal that would achieve the same improvements over the 
current system. 
Number of NLRB Members 1978-1993 
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Chart VI 
3. The efficient administration of the National Labor Relations Act would be 
jeopardized by major changes in enforcement, including the remedies available. The Report 
clearly implies that the remedies available under the National Labor Relations Act are too 
weak, comparing them to the compensatory and punitive remedies available under other 
employment statutes. However, the likely result of expanding those remedies can be seen in 
Chapter IV, which demonstrates the effect of tort remedies on the judicial system. Clearly, 
the efficiency of any enforcement scheme is closely tied to its remedies. The success of the 
current NLRA process which we have just outlined could only be jeopardized by a move 
towards more punitive remedies. As the stakes are raised, the willingness of the parties to 
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enter into settlement decreases. That is the principal reason disputes at the NLRB where 
back pay is the remedy are settled so much more quickly than disputes before the EEOC 
where up to $300,000 in punitive and compensatory damages, over and above any backpay 
that might be awarded, for each claim of discrimination is available. Further, if punitive or 
compensatory damages were to be authorized under the NLRA, it would entail a right to a 
jury trial, thus eliminating the current system of adjudicating matters before an administrative 
law judge. 
4. "Outsiders" frequently plav an active role in union representation elections. The 
Report attaches great significance to the "fact" (unsubstantiated) that management hires a 
consultant in 70% of all elections.36 These outsiders (who often are labor law attorneys 
hired to make sure that the employer complies with the highly technical provisions of the 
NLRA) seem to be viewed by the Commission as somehow "tainting" the election process. 
We would point out that "outsiders" in the form of union organizers are present in nearly 
100% of all campaigns and are usually on the scene long before the management consultants 
are brought in. 
Response to Questions Posed by the Commission 
On pages 79 and 80 of Chapter III the Commission poses a series of questions for 
further discussion. Our response to these is as follows: 
1. "How might cooperation in mature bargaining relationships be increased?" Given 
the Report's conclusion that "the system of labor-management negotiations works well" 
36
 Report, 68. The source for this finding is not provided in the Report. Curiously, immediately after 
citing this statistic, the Report states: "There are no accurate statistics on consultant activity." Id. 
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where collective bargaining is already in place—a conclusion with which we wholeheartedly 
agree—we are not sure how a mature relationship can be made more mature. If the question 
is directed at how a cooperative relationship can be instituted in an environment which has 
historically been characterized by an adversarial relationship of traditional collective 
bargaining, the experience of LPA members indicates that change in such circumstances may 
be possible only where both labor and management come to the realization that it is in their 
worst interest to continue dealing with one another on a confrontational basis. There are 
numerous examples in which the catalyst for positive change to a cooperative relationship 
was the parties being pushed to the brink, such as by a dire economic threat to the 
organization's business, or a bitter strike over an issue that could have been easily resolved 
had the parties been willing to deal with one another on a basis of trust at the outset. 
It will be very difficult to increase cooperation, however, so long as the leadership 
and policy departments of international unions actively encourage their members in the field 
to resist cooperative workplace ventures. There are dozens of examples within the LPA 
membership of union locals desiring to adopt more collaborative work systems, but the 
international is strongly opposed. The Teamsters, for example, teach courses to their field 
personnel on how to prevent the growth of employee involvement programs in the 
workplace. There are a number of union publications laying out strategies and tactics for 
dismembering employee involvement.37 As long as cooperative programs like employee 
involvement and employee participation are seen as a threat instead of a protection, it will be 
difficult to increase cooperation in traditional union work settings. 
37
 Chapter 5 of A Troublemaker's Handbook: How to Fight Back Where You Work, Inside the Circle: A 
Union Guide to Quality of Work Life, and Choosing Sides: Unions and the Team Concept 
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2. "Should the labor law seek to provide workers who want representation but who 
are a minority at a workplace a greater option for non-exclusive representation?" We can 
think of few recommendations that could be made by this Commission that would be more 
counterproductive to improving worker-management relations. The experience of our 
companies in other countries where minority representation is standard practice has shown 
that it can become very disruptive, with the potential for considerable confusion as to who 
speaks for whom. 
As was noted by the Warren Court in Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLKB (Bernhard-
Altmann Texas Corp.),n freedom of choice and majority rule are the very "premise of the 
Act" as it is now written. An employer only has a duty to bargain with a union which has 
been certified by the National Labor Relations Board after being elected by a majority of the 
employees in the unit. An employer may also voluntarily recognize and bargain with a 
union, but only if the employer has objective evidence that a majority of the employees 
support that union. Proposals to expand employer obligations to include unions which 
represent less than a majority contradict this premise. 
In his August 10 testimony, AFL-CIO Labor Law Task Force Director David 
Silberman contended that there was adequate precedent for the concept of minority 
representation, citing Executive Order 10988 signed by President Kennedy in January 1962. 
This Executive Order provided for "formal recognition" where a union in the Federal 
employee workplace represented at least 10% of the employees and "informal recognition" if 
it represented less. Unfortunately, Mr. Silberman failed to mention that those provisions of 
the Executive Order were abandoned in 1969 following a report submitted by Labor 
38
 366 U.S. 731, 738-9(1961). 
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Secretary George Shultz, among others, which came to the following conclusions: 
[Formal recognition] has produced problems which hinder the 
development of stable and orderly labor relations. It has 
contributed to excessive fragmentation of units, confusing and 
overlapping relationships, and difficulties in rriaintaining an 
appropriate difference in the rights and obligations under this 
form of recognition compared with those prescribed for 
exclusive. For these reasons, the majority of agencies have 
indicated that formal recognition should be discontinued.39 
The report did observe that labor unions favored retention of "formal recognition" because 
they regarded it "as a significant form of assistance in further organizing the work force, 
particularly because it makes possible obtaining dues withholding privileges."40 
If the majority of the employees in a bargaining unit has voted against third party 
representation, it would seem important to honor the will of the majority. Honoring that will 
has certainly been the doctrine organized labor adamantly pursued when private sector 
representation percentages were far higher earlier this century, and it should still be the case. 
We would note that while expressing support for a new form of minority "rights" in the area 
of union representation, labor still continues to oppose the right of the minority to decline to 
pay dues to a union which has been elected by the majority, but which the minority does not 
support. 
39
 Study Committee (composed of Department of Labor Secretary George P. Shultz, Department of 
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, Civil Service Commission Chairman Robert E. Hampton, and Bureau of 
the Budget Director Robert P. Mayo), Report and Recommendations on Labor-Management Relations in the 
Federal Service, (August 1969), 13. 
40
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From the standpoint of human resource practitioners, there are a number of practical 
problems with minority representation as well. First, it is much simpler to administer human 
resource policies when all employees can be treated similarly. We are not certain precisely 
what the AFL-CIO is proposing, but it appears to be a sliding scale of third party 
representation obligations depending on the level of interest in a particular workplace in such 
representation. Questions then arise as to how the employer is to know which group of 
employees fit into which category. For example, a union may claim to be representing 100 
employees for purposes of informal consultation, but the employer may not know for sure 
without polling each of those employees—an action that may be considered an illegal 
coercive tactic under the labor laws. Further, without some clear determination regarding 
employee preference, some employees may vacillate between being represented by the union 
one month and not the other, depending on how they feel about its actions at the time. 
The situation would be further complicated where more than one union was present. 
What if the employer is receiving conflicting signals regarding such important issues as work 
schedules, discipline, methods of payment, transfers, and the like from two or more minority 
unions in what would otherwise be a single bargaining unit. For example, one union may 
represent the more senior employees and be pushing for stronger seniority rights while 
another may be pushing for merit-based policies. The workplace may start looking more like 
the parliament of a Third World country than the cooperative environment which should be 
our objective. 
3. "Should unions be given greater access to employees on the job during 
organizational campaigns, and if so how?" With respect to union organizers being given 
greater statutory rights to enter a workplace for the purpose of persuading employees to join 
a union, we believe that current law is already weighted in favor of unions by their legal 
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right to contact employees in their homes, a right not accorded management. Indeed, the 
AFL-CIO survey cited above found this to be among the most effective organizing techniques 
available to unions. According to the survey: 
In cases where the organizer house called between 60 and 75% 
of the unit, the win rate was 78%. If the organizer made no 
home visits, the win rate was 41 %.41 
In contrast, where the use of mass meetings was the primary campaign tactic, the win rate 
was only 25%.42 
Thus, there appears to be little justification to warrant the disruption of a company's 
operations that would be created by requiring companies to open their doors to organizing 
rallies at the worksite. Moreover, if there is a genuine desire for unionization on the part of 
the workforce, what should be the most effective organizers—i.e., the pro-union members of 
the unit—are already working on the site and have all the access that is needed. 
4. "How can the level of conflict and the amount of resources devoted to union 
recognition campaigns be de-escalated?" The solution to this will be difficult to achieve in a 
system which is premised on the belief that labor and management have fundamentally 
different interests that can only be reconciled through the adversarial process of collective 
bargaining. It will also be difficult to achieve as long as labor's approach to an unorganized 
workplace is to identify the areas of disagreement between management and labor and then 
seek to exacerbate those disagreements. Commissioner Kreps may have phrased the issue 
best in her question to the head of the AFL-CIO Organizing Institute on August 10 when she 
41
 AFL-CIO Survey, 49. 
42
 AFL-CIO Survey, 50. 
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said, "We're being asked to conclude, then, that most employers are bad guys because of the 
low percentage of unions, right?" 
The Report suggests that one way of resolving these tensions is for management and 
international labor unions to agree between themselves that the employees will be represented 
by the international and that the employees covered by that agreement should be denied a 
voice in that decision. While some companies have entered into such agreements, as an 
Association we cannot support the elimination of the necessary element of democratic choice 
that forms the critical foundation for healthy labor-management relations in this country. 
Indeed, notwithstanding our complaints regarding Electromation, if there is anything in 
section 8(a)(2) that should be retained, it should be the prohibition against a company 
v 
choosing a labor union for its employees. 
5. "What new techniques might produce more effective compliance with prohibitions 
against discriminatory discharges, bad faith bargaining, and other illegal actions?" Since 
most organizing activity is now focused on smaller companies who often do not have the 
resources to obtain quality legal advice, and since most of the violations are now occurring in 
those companies, we believe there is a greater need today for education, training and 
counseling of employers of their rights and obligations under the law. A small employer 
who cannot afford to be counseled by a labor lawyer regarding the intricacies of the National 
Labor Relations Act is at a disadvantage with the union, which has the legal resources of the 
union's lawyers as well as the NLRB General Counsel operating at public expense. We do 
not question this system. Indeed, we believe NLRB enforcement data and timetables have 
proven it to be effective. However, we think it is time to eliminate the "surprise" factor 
from this process for the small employer and provide early intervention to prevent violations, 
rather than punish them after they have already occurred. 
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One solution may be to for the NLRA to be amended to provide an "Office of 
Employer Counsel" at the NLRB that could conduct training programs and offer advice to 
employers regarding their rights, liabilities and obligations under the Act. We do not believe 
that adding expensive penalties to the NLRA is the solution because the problems of 
excessive litigation discussed in Chapter IV can be attributed in large part to the availability 
of these remedies. The potential for significant monetary damages simply makes litigation 
more attractive to the parties, ultimately triggering more delays in the system overall. We 
note the absence of any discussion in Chapter IV of NLRB remedies being inadequate. 
Clearly, the Board has at its disposal severe remedies that may be used against a 
recalcitrant employer. In the classic case of J.P. Stevens, the Board was not limited to back 
pay and bargaining orders. The company was also ordered to reimburse the union for its 
bargaining expenses, including clerical costs and salary and mileage expenses incurred during 
the violation period. Further, the company was ordered to reimburse the union and the 
Board for litigation costs and, in the case of the union, even its organizing expenses. In 
addition, the Board issued company-wide orders that applied to all locations where the union 
was present and not just those involved in the immediate litigation.43 
Finally, where swift measures are necessary, the Board has the power to seek an 
injunction. Although the Report states that NLRB section 10(j) injunctions are "pursued 
infrequently each year," the Board has significantly increased the use of these injunctions in 
recent months. According to Chairman Gould, the Board has sought 50 injunctions in the 
past five months, compared to 42 for all of last year. Moreover, he claims a success rate of 
43
 J.P. Stevens & Co., 244 NLRB No. 407 (1979). 
87 %.44 
6. "What, if anything, should be done to increase the probability that workers who 
vote for representation and their employers achieve a first contract and on-going bargaining 
relationship?" Both labor and management have long proclaimed the virtues of "free 
collective bargaining"—i.e., bargaining without governmental involvement—and we consider 
any efforts to abandon this approach unwise. Our system of collective bargaining was never 
set up in a way that would guarantee that bargaining would always produce an agreement nor 
should it be amended to do so. If it were, it would no longer be free collective bargaining. 
Sometimes, "hard bargaining" by both sides results in no agreement as seen in recent years 
in a number of highly visible strikes (e.g., Caterpillar, Massey, Phelps Dodge) that have 
been triggered by the union's unyielding demand that the employer sign the same agreement 
as all other employers in the industry. When the union refuses to discuss any variations 
from the pattern, one could reasonably argue that, in these cases, it is the union's insistence 
that leads to the impasse. Is this "hard bargaining" or is it "surface bargaining?" 
Conclusion 
The Commission on the Future of Worker/Management Relations provides a unique 
opportunity for the development of a balanced set of recommendations regarding improving 
federal policies governing relationships among employees, employers and unions. In 
Chapters II and IV of its Fact Finding Report the Commission has prepared the necessary 
factual foundation on which substantive discussions of policy changes can be built. Both 
44
 William B. Gould, "Changes in Labor Law: Here and Now and the Future," Spokane, August 22, 1994 
(speech reprinted in the Daily Labor Report, August 25, 1994). 
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Chapter II dealing with employee involvement and Chapter IV addressing the need for 
improved dispute resolution systems represent a good faith effort to describe the present 
situation in such a manner that all persons with a stake in the outcome of the Commission's 
deliberations can be assured that its final recommendations are likely to address their 
concerns fairly. 
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of Chapter HI. The Commission's treatment 
of union representation and collective bargaining lays out a biased set of facts that only 
represents organized labor's point of view. Unless the Commission is willing to look at 
both sides of the worker-management equation on these critically important issues, its 
forthcoming recommendations in this area almost certainly will not provide the basis for a 
meaningful dialogue on proposed policy changes. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This report summarizes the findings of a study by the AFL-CIO 
Department of Organization and Field Services of 189 NLRB 
elections in units over 50 that took place during July 1986 through 
April 1987. In order to obtain this dat8, lengthy interviews were 
conducted with the lead organizers in these campaigns, during which 
questions were asked concerning the union's tactics, the company's 
tactics, and characteristics of the workforce. 
This study is similar to a survey of elections held in 1982-83, 
and, where relevant, comparisons are made to the results obtained 
from this earlier survey. 
Overview 
Unions had an overall win rate of 43% in units over 50. This is 
identical to the win rate in the 1982-83 survey. It is slightly lower 
than the overall percentage of election victories during this time 
period, because this survey excluded units under 50 in size. With 
units of all sizes included, unions won 48% of the NLRB elections 
held in 1985 and 49% of the ejections held in 1987. 
Uhions clearly have a problem organizing larger units. As the 
unit size increases, the win rate declines considerably. In units of 75 
and under, unions win 51% of the elections. When the size increases 
to 75-150, the win rate drops to 47%. For units with between 150 and 
250 eligible employees, the union success rate is 32%. And for units 
between 250 and 500, the win rate is 21%. There were no victories in 
units over 500 in this sample. 
The manufacturing aector is the most difficult to organize, 
according to both this survey and the earlier survey. The union win 
rate in manufacturing units is 40%, as opposed to 50% in the non-
manufacturing sector, which includes services, health care, and 
retail. In health care, the win rate is 55%, and in retail the win rate 
is 56% (although the latter sample was very small.) 
The northeast, particularly New England, is the most 
inhospitable region for union organizing. The win rate in the 
northeast is 32%. The greatest percentage of organizing success is in 
the west/southwest, where there i t a 5 1 % rate of victory. In the 
southeast, the win rate is 42%, and in the midwest the rate is 46%. 
Uhions were able to obtain a contract after winning an election 
in 73% of the cases. This is an improvement over the 63% rate of 
achieving first contracts observed in the earlier survey. However, in 
units over 150, the success rate in achieving first contracts is only 
40%. 
It is clear that certain factors in union and employer conduct, 
as well »s in the nature of the industry and workforce, correlate to a 
greater l.ke .hood of union success in organizing. The following 
chapters of this report summarize some of the conclusions which can 
be drawn from the survey data. 
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UNION CAMPAIGN TACTICS 
There is a clear correlation between certain features of the 
union's campaign strategy and the union's ability to win NLRB 
elections in units over 50. 
Committee 
The most significant factor leading to union success, according 
to the organizers, is active campaigning by an effective, 
representative committee. In the absence of an effective 
committee, the win rate is only 10%. Where the organizing 
committee does engage in active campaigning, the win rate is 62%. 
It appears that a larger committee is required than was 
indicated by the 1982-83 survey. A committee should be optimally 
15% of the unit or more. A committee pf less than 5% of the unit 
correlates to a win rate of only 27%. 
Cards 
There appears to be a negative impact when organizers release 
authorization cards prior to the formation of this committee. Where 
cards are released prior to forming 2 committee, the win rate is onjy 
30%. 
The number of authorization cards obtained has a direct 
relationship to the likelihood of the union prevailing. It is not until 
the union obtains signatures from 75% or more of the unit that the 
union has more than a 50% likelihood of winning the election. This is 
higher percentage than was required in the 1982-83 survey, where the 
union had an even chance of winning if £5% of the unit signed cards. 
This may be indicative of increasing intensity or sophistication in 
employer campaigns. According to the current survey, if less than 
40% of the unit signs cards, the union wins only 8% of the time. 
Where the union obtains cards from 40-50% of the unit, the union 
wins 33% of the campaigns. If 50-60% of the unit sign authorization 
cards, the union wins 45% of the elections. When 60-75% of the unit 
sign cards, there is a victory rate of 49%. With 75% or more of the 
unit signed vpt unions win 60% of the campaigns. 
- 48 -
Persona! Contact 
The survey provides some clear indicators of the importance of 
personal face-to-face contact between organizers and the employees 
as the preferred method of communication during the union 
campaign. 
The most frequently cited reason for losing campaigns is a lack 
of sufficient personal contact with employees, and insufficient staff. 
In 26% of the campaigns, there was no full-time organizer. In 55% of 
the campaigns studied, there was one organizer or less. 
House calls are an effective means of establishing personal 
communication. In cases where the organizer house called between 
60 and 75% of the unit, the win rate was 78%. If the organizer made 
no home visits, the win rate was 41%. 
Attempts to communicate with employees through means other 
than personal contact seem to impact unfavorably on the ability to 
win union campaigns: 
In campaigns where the union mailed letters as a 
primary means of campaigning, the win rate was 
only 39%, as opposed to a win rate of 55% when the 
union did not campaign through the mail. 
* When organizers used the telephone as a primary 
means of campaigning, the win rate was only 40%. 
If the telephone was not used in this manner, the 
win rate was 52%. 
The use of videotapes by orqanizers was correlated 
to only a 36% win rate. Use of the mass media as 
part of the campaign was associated with 46% rate 
of victory, although both of these involved small 
samples. 
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Mass Meetings 
General or mass meetings offer opportunities as well as 
dangers, according to the aurvey. There is a direct correlation 
between average attendance at the general meetings and the victory 
rate. If less than 25% of the unit attends mass meetings, the win 
rate is 29%. If attendance is between 25-40%, the win rate is 33%. 
If the average attendance is between 40-50% of the unit, the win rate 
rises to 55%. If 50-60% attend the mass meetings, the win rate is 
67%. And more than 60% attended the mass meetings on average, 
the win rate is 72%. This would suggest that unless the organizer 
expects to have at least 40% of the unit in attendance at a mass 
meeting, It may be harmful to call the meeting. This is consistent 
with other studies which suggest the importance of the employees' 
perceptions about the level of union support among their co-workers 
as a factor in their decision about whether to vote for the union. The 
use of mass meetings as the primary campaign tactic was related to a 
win rate of only 25%. 
Issues 
Where wages are the primary union issue, the win rate is only 
33%. Other issues are associated with a much higher rate of victory. 
The three most effective union issues are: 
Working Conditions - Where working conditions are 
a top union issue, the win rate is 69%. 
Grievance Procedure - Where the desire for a 
procedure to achieve fairness on the job is a top 
issue, the win rate is 67%. 
Dignity - Where dignity on the job is a key issue, 
unions have win rate of 55%. 
Timing 
Unions do not aeem to benefit from long, drawn-out pre-
petition periods. Where there is 15 days or less from the date of the 
first contacts to the Tiling of the petition, the win rate is 55%. The 
win rate then drops, but if the petition is filed from 60-90 days after 
the first contract, the win rate goes up again to 65%. If the length 
of time from the initial contacts to the filing of the petition extends 
beyond 90 days, the win rate drops dramatically to 41%. If the prt' 
petition period lasts more than 6 months, the win rate drops even 
further to 33%. 
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WORKFORCE 
There are certain features of the workforce that appear to be 
associated with a higher probability of union success. 
As stated in the introduction, union success is greater in the 
service sector than in manufacturing. The highest win rates are in 
health care and retail establishments (55% and 56% respectively.) 
Low Wage Workers 
Low wage employees are more likely to vote to form a union, 
than higher paid employees. Unions win 58% of the elections among 
workers earning $5 an hour or Jess. (This is despite the fact that 
when wages are the primary issue the win rate is very low.) 
There does not seem to be a clear connection between the 
quality of the company's benefit package and the ability of the union 
to win the election. 
Women 
The presence of a large proportion of female workers 
significantly increases the union's chance of success. In units where 
women comprise less than half of the workforce, the win rate is only 
33%. Where women make up more than 75% of the unit, the union's 
win rate is 57%. More than half of the union election victories 
feature a workforce with a majority of women. 
ft is interesting to note that this support for unions by women 
occurs despite the fact that organizing is an overwhelmingly male 
profession. Only 9% of the organizers in this survey mre women. 
However, the success rate for women is 61%, as opposed to 8 41% 
success rate for male organizers. 
Minorities 
Unions have the greatest chance of success if the workforce is 
more than 75% minority. In such cases, the win rate is 65%. In units 
where less than 25% of the workers are minorities, the win rate is 
only 38%. Similarly, where only a slioht majority of the workers are 
minorities, the win rate is only 37%. This may point to the 
employer's ability to divide a workforce along racial lines where 
there is a fairly even division by race or ethnic group. 
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Younger Workers 
A -workforce with a substantial number of younger workers is. 
more likely to be organized. If the average age is 35 or less, the win' 
rate is 48%, as opposed to a win rate of 30% if the workforce is over 
35. However, an extremely young workforce, where more than 75% 
of the workers are under 25, is associated with a win rate of only 
29%. 
Immigrants 
The presence of undocumented immigrants in the workforce 
indicated a strong likelihood of success. Such units had a win rate of 
63% (although the sample was small). 
PT'IOT Union Exposure 
Familiarity and prior experience with unions has an ambiguous 
effect on the ability of unions to win NLRB elections. If there are 
no former union members in the unit, the win rate drops to 39%. If 
former union members make up a small portion of the work force, the 
win rate rises slightly. However, if former members made up more 
than half of the workforce, the win rate is only 29%. 
It is harmful to have another unit organized at the same site. 
In such cases, the union has a win rate of only 36%. On the other 
hand, an organized unit at another facility of the same company 
brings the win rate up to 47%. In communities where union density is 
only moderate, the win rate is very low — 25%. Unions fare better in 
communities with either very high union density or very low 
unionization levels. 
Prior campaigns at the facility seem to have a negative impact 
on the union's ability to win, particularly if the campaign does not go 
to an election. Where the workforce has experienced a union 
campaign without an election, the win rate is 30%. If there was a 
previous election, the win rate was 39%. 
Rural/Urban 
The union victory rate is lowest in rural areas (39%). Small 
towns have the highest rate of success (57%), and urban areas have a 
win rate of 43%. 
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THE EMPLOYER ANTI-UNION CAMPAIGN 
The degree of employer resistance is • major factor In the 
ability of unions to win r*_RB elections. If the employer does not 
wage a significant campaign against the union, the win rate is 80% 
Even a moderately serious campaign by the employer is associated 
with a 63% union success rate. But where the employer wages an 
intense campaign against the union, the win rate is 35%. 
In the vast majority of campaigns, the employer hires an anti-
union consu tant (76%). The absence of a consultant is related to 
55% union victory rate. 
Management's arsenal contains a variety of effective tactics -
both of a positive and negative nature. 
On the positive side: 
If the company makes promises to improve conditions, 
the w,n rate for unions is 34%, as opposed to 56% if 
such promises are not made. 
• Changes in management are associated with a union v*in 
rate of only 38%. 
If employees receive a wage increase during the 
campaign, the win rate is 31%. 
• The presence of quality of work life programs are 
disastrous for unions; only 17% of elections were 
successful where such programs are present. 
Discharges 
•K. j T h ? d i s c h a , r 9 e o f 8 t l e a s t o n e u n i o n «ctivist occurs In 29% of 
2 ? Aef£.\°nS* I n t e r e s t i n Q l y , u*°<* « « m to haveTrSher success 
tflmi * « £ • * * " * ? « * • ™ng than where there is not a firing 
41%). This might .ndicate that companies resort to firitL w h e « 
they are fearful of losing the campaign. ^ 
• u b * ^ , I , I k e I i ^° d ° f * * e m p l ° v e r rirlnQ » ""ion activist Increases 
substantially as the percentage of minorities In the unit increaseTlf" 
Is o r nlv r ?^ m i n ° r i t i e s p r e . s e n t * » t h e «»«. « * likelihood of discharge 
s only 22%. But as minorities approach 50% of the unit the 
likelihood of a discharge goes up to 46%. This likelihood remains 
thfs'poi'S? ^ ^ " t h C P C r C e n t a 9 e o f "^°rities rises^o^ 
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Issues 
The three most powerful company issues, in order of 
effectiveness, are: 
1. Asking for another chance 
2. Predicting lay-offs or company closings 
3. Warning of the likelihood of a strike 
Delay 
Delay is an effective tactic on management's part. in 
campaigns where the election took place within 60 days or less of the 
filing of petition, the union win rate was 50%. If the election took 
place within 60-90 days, the win rate was only 31%. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the vast majority of cases, unions fae» .»•«« * 
management daring NLRB election campaigns$t , f f'"«$t8nce , r o m 
campaigns feature both "Wet talk" - promises' «• e • n t , - u n , ° ] 
•care tactics about strikes and c l o s i n g ^ ^ etc'.H" 8"? 
management's campaign .re equaliy effecti* V "H W 
complement each other. F elective, and indeed 
ongoing °%^ ™^t£' T^^tl^ SfC 
committee. This committee should e o U T ^ S l * f f S 2 
of the unit, and must actively campaion to win the \**L**t%3Zi 
the workforce. House calls are an effective mean! nfP ?5 % ,° f 
with employees; where o r g S ^ ^ ^ S ^ k S S T e ^ S ^ 
calls to communicate with employee*; the S m S t a n ^ S t a L P ^ E 
need for personal communication implies that for ?^;!l ^ 
srsMES'"— «* •- ™£.£E£S 
WHO j s y i x s t s : iTow"
 8r„
eos:kin-rin9 with p e ° > " 
immigrants, young workers. Tn? iKues t £ ? £ ™"' m i n ° r " i e s ' 
the best are the desire to i J . ™ ! ..- r v e u m o n °r9ahWng 
p r o o e d u r e ^ r r e s o t n ^ ^ L T a n o X u ^ X f o o : ' « 
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